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  This study analyzes U.S. consumers’ choice of cornflakes under five different labeling 
statements. Using a nationwide survey and choice modeling framework, results indicate that 
consumers value labeling statements differently, depending on the information contained on 
the label. The random parameter logit model results indicated that, compared to cornflakes 
that have no label information, cornflakes labeled “contains no genetically modified corn” 
have a value of 10 percent more, the label “USDA approved genetically modified corn” has a 
value of 5 percent more, and the label “corn genetically modified to reduce pesticide residues 
in your food” has a value of 5 percent more. The results also suggest that consumers nega-
tively valued the label “contains genetically modified corn,” paying 6.5 percent less, and the 
label “may contain genetically modified corn,” paying 1 percent less than the product that has 
no label information. 
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Labeling of genetically modified (GM) foods 
remains a contentious issue. To date, there is no 
conclusive research on how GM food products 
should be labeled or if consumers in the United 
States would value such labeling information. 
Globally, countries are grappling to form a con-
sensus on a harmonized, internationally accept-
able system. However, given the influence of 
economic and political structures in various 
countries, it is more likely that we will see differ-
ent labeling requirements in different regions or 
countries. For example, in the European Union 
(EU), regulations related to mandatory labeling of 
GM foods are already in place. In contrast, the 
United States has no mandatory labeling require-
ments pertaining to GM foods. 
  Evidence from public polls in the United States 
and elsewhere shows overwhelming support for 
labeling of GM foods. A recent national survey 
showed that 94 percent of U.S. consumers agree 
that food containing GM ingredients should be 
labeled. Similar consumer surveys in France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom suggest that 
about 90 percent of consumers would opt for 
mandatory labeling of beef produced from cattle 
fed on genetically modified crops (Hallman et al. 
2003, 2004; Roosen, Lusk, and Fox 2001). It is 
possible that the clamor for labeling regulations 
arises from the public mistrust of GM food prod-
ucts. A study conducted by Hallman et al. (2004) 
showed that about 70 percent of the American 
public do not know that GM foods are tested for 
human safety, and that about three-quarters (76 
percent) do not know that GM foods are tested 
for environmental safety. 
  While disagreements on a harmonized GM la-
beling policy persist, adoption of genetically modi-
fied crops worldwide is increasing (Figure 1). To 
date, 20 percent of global soybean, corn, cotton, 
and canola acreage is genetically modified. The 
leaders in the production of these GM crops are 
the United States, Argentina, Canada, and China 
(James 2003, Pew Initiative on Food and Biotech-
nology 2004). Due to increasing acreage allocated 
to GM crops in the United States, estimates sug-
gest that between 60 and 70 percent of processed 
foods in U.S. supermarkets now include at least a 
fragment of a GM ingredient. 
_________________________________________ 
Benjamin Onyango is Research Associate in the Food Policy Institute 
at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey. Rodolfo M. 
Nayga, Jr., is Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics at 
Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas. Ramu Govindasamy is 
Associate Professor in the Department of Agricultural, Food, and Re-
source Economics at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
  The authors thank anonymous journal reviewers and the editors for 
helpful comments and suggestions. 
  As of August 2001, 28 countries worldwide 
had passed some form of regulatory framework 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 35/2 (October 2006) 299–310 
Copyright 2006 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 300    October 2006  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Figure 1. Global Area of Transgenic Crops (increase of 15 percent—9 million hectares, or 22.2 
million acres—between 2002 and 2003) 
Source: James (2003). 
 
 
on GM foods (Phillips and McNeill 2000). These 
regulations include total bans on GM technology 
as well as mandatory or voluntary labeling. The 
voluntary labeling regime gives food producers 
the right to choose whether or not to label their 
products, as long as the labeling information is 
truthful and not misleading. On the other hand, a 
mandatory labeling regime would normally re-
quire that all products that contain genetically 
modified ingredients be clearly and prominently 
labeled (Caswell 2000). 
  While the United States, Argentina, and Can-
ada have fully embraced GM crops, the EU has 
been relatively cautious.  The EU’s position on 
GM labeling may have to do more with ethi-
cal/moral considerations. Recent experiences re-
lated to mad cow disease and other food scares 
have also played a part in shaping the EU’s GM 
labeling policy (Roosen, Lusk, and Fox 2001, 
Rousu and Huffman 2001). In contrast to the 
EU’s approach, the U.S. voluntary labeling re-
gime requires GM foods to be labeled if the food 
has significantly different nutritional properties, 
includes an allergen that consumers would not 
expect to be present, or contains a toxicant be-
yond acceptable limits. Mandatory labeling re-
gimes for GM foods have important and chal-
lenging implications. For example, mandatory 
labeling may require segregation imposed on the 
entire agricultural system, thus increasing the cost 
burden of providing information (Huygen, Vee-
man, and Lerohl 2003, Muth, Mancini, and Viator 
2003). Consequently, GM labeling might cost the 
consumers, industry, and government to varying 
degrees (Huygen, Veeman, and Lerohl 2003, 
Caswell 2000, Runge and Jackson 2000). Golder 
and Leung (2000) showed that the cost of label-
ing might increase food prices by 10 percent in 
Canada. 
  A few studies have investigated consumers’ 
willingness to pay for GM labeling. Most of the 
research on the subject has examined the advan-
tages and disadvantages of implementation ap-
proaches and the likely corresponding costs 
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(Huygen, Veeman, and Lerohl 2003). In particu-
lar, support and opposition to mandatory or vol-
untary labeling regimes have been popular sub-
jects of study (Rousu et al. 2004; Caswell 1998, 
2000; Carter and Gruère 2003). Also investigated 
were topics relating to asymmetric information 
impacts on producers, government, and industry, 
as well as topics on label information prioritiza-
tion (Huffman 2003, Fulton and Giannakas 2004, 
McCluskey and Loureiro 2003, Senhui, Fletcher, 
and Rimal 2003, Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell 
2000). Other studies have focused on language 
and label positioning (Hallman, Aquino, and 
Phillips 2003). A recent study by Carlsson, Fryk-
blom, and Lagerkvist (2004) measured willing-
ness to pay for mandatory labeling, voluntary 
labeling, or total bans of GM beef, pork, and eggs 
in Sweden. The findings of this study showed that 
GM foods can be a credence good that may cause 
market failure. Additionally, the study found that 
consumers are willing to pay a significantly 
higher product price to ensure a total ban on the 
use of GM food in animal fodder. 
  None of these studies, however, has investi-
gated the effect of GM label statements on con-
sumer behavior. Findings from recent focus group 
studies in the United States and research on GM 
labels in Canada have suggested that the wording 
on labels could have a significant effect on con-
sumer understanding and acceptance of biotech-
nology (Hallman, Aquino, and Phillips 2003, Hu, 
Veeman, and Adamowicz 2005). There also are 
concerns as to whether consumers would use such 
labels (Li, McCluskey, and Wahl 2004, Teisl et 
al. 2003). 
  To fill this void, this study assesses consumers’ 
choice of cornflakes under different GM label 
wording. In particular, this study contributes to 
the ongoing debate by assessing consumers’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for information pro-
vided by a GM label. In the following sections, 
we will discuss the survey methods, the empirical 





A survey instrument developed by the Food Pol-
icy Institute at Rutgers University was used to 
collect data for this study. The survey collected 
information on core questions related to Ameri-
can awareness and knowledge of GM foods, 
willingness to purchase GM products, attitudes 
toward risks and benefits, opinions on mandatory 
product labeling, and overall approval of the 
transgenic technique as it relates to animal and 
plant biotechnology. The Food Policy Institute 
contracted the opinion polling firm Shulman, 
Ronca, and Bucuvalas, Inc., to conduct 1,201 tele-
phone interviews using computer-assisted tele-
phone interview (CATI) technology. 
 Interviewers were consistently monitored 
throughout the field period. The interviews were 
conducted between May 4, 2004, and June 14, 
2004.
1 To reduce interview time, the survey was 
split into two versions. The two versions shared 
core questions, but included different supple-
mental questions. Version A had 601 respondents 
and an average interview time of 19.5 minutes, 
and Version B had 600 respondents and an aver-
age interview time of 21.9 minutes. All inter-
views were conducted in English. Potential re-
spondents were selected using national random 
digit dialing across the entire United States. U.S. 
Census Bureau population estimates determined 
the distribution necessary for proportionate geo-
graphic coverage. Appropriate weighting on age, 
gender, and race was done to correct for dispro-
portionate representation. 
  The CATI program guided a random but bal-
anced selection process to ensure that a represen-
tative number of males and females were inter-
viewed. The CATI program is designed to work 
with the random sample already selected. To en-
sure representation in the interviewing process, 
the program makes reference to the number of 
males and females interviewed thus far and re-
vises the next line of interviewees to accommo-
date the underrepresented gender to achieve the 
required balance. 
  Many of the telephone numbers originally se-
lected as part of the sampling frame were ex-
cluded as non-residential or non-working num-
bers. Only 25 percent of the numbers selected at 
random yielded completed interviews. However, 
calls to 66 percent of the working residential 
numbers resulted in completed interviews. To 
 
1 No major events associated with biotechnology that could have 
influenced responses and therefore biased the results took place during 
the interviewing process. Additionally, the interviews were closely 
monitored for quality, and we believe that the period was adequate for 
successful completion of the process. 
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achieve the maximum response rate, many work-
ing numbers were attempted 16 or more times. 
Numbers were dialed on different days of the 
week and at varying times of day in an effort to 
reach elusive respondents. For households that 
used call-blocking systems, the research company 
allowed identifying information to be displayed. 
If an answering machine picked up three times in 
a row on any given number, interviewers left 
messages identifying the research company and 
the purpose of the call. When weighted, the 1,201 
completed interviews had a sampling error of ±3 
percent.
2 For those questions asked of only half 
the sample, the sampling error increases to ±4 
percent. After completing the telephone survey, 
the 1,201 respondents were asked if they would 
be willing to participate in a follow-up mail ques-
tionnaire. The purpose of this follow-up mail 
questionnaire was to collect data relating to con-
sumers’ stated preferences about cornflakes and 
the consumers’ trust in institutions associated 
with biotechnology. About 47 percent of the re-
spondents (559) agreed to participate in the mail 
survey. These respondents were then mailed the 
questionnaire and $5 as an incentive to return the 
completed questionnaire within 3 to 4 days. All 
the questionnaires were sent through first-class 
mail with a cover letter thanking the respondents 
for their participation. A follow-up letter with the 
questionnaire was sent to those who did not re-
spond within 14 days after the first mailing. A 
total of 363 (65 percent) of the surveys were re-
turned, of which 7 were incomplete (1 percent). 
  The previous focus-group research on labeling 
done by Hallman, Aquino, and Phillips (2003) 
and the study by Onyango, Govindasamy, and 
Nayga (2004) were the basis for deciding the 
product analyzed in this study. The product had to 
be readily available in stores, had to be familiar to 
a majority of consumers, and had to partly con-
tain GM ingredients. Cornflakes were selected as 
the product based on these three factors. 
 
                                                                                   
2 The sampling error associated with a nationwide sample of 1,200 
people is approximately ±3 percent with a 95 percent confidence 
interval. This means that if 50 percent of the respondents gave a 
particular response, the likely percentage of the entire adult population 
should be between 47 percent and 53 percent, 95 out of 100 times. The 
cooperation rate is the percentage of completed interviews (1,201) over 
completed interviews (1,201) plus refusals (636). A more rigid calcula-
tion of response rate, defined as the percentage of completed inter-
views (1,201) over total numbers of in-frame telephone numbers 
(3,120), yields a response rate of 38.5 percent. 
  One section of the mail survey was devoted to 
providing background information on genetic 
modification and labeling. In terms of back-
ground, the following information was provided: 
 
▪  Definition of GM.
3  Genetic modification as 
used in food production involves methods that 
make it possible for scientists to create new va-
rieties of plants and animals by taking parts of 
the genes of one plant or animal and inserting 
them into the cells of another plant or animal. 
The process of genetic modification, often called 
transgenic transformation or DNA recombina-
tion, occurs when biochemists take desirable 
genes from one plant or animal and insert them 
into the genetic material of another plant or 
animal with the purpose of exploiting a trait 
from the original organism. This is sometimes 
called genetic engineering or biotechnology. 
 
▪  GM corn in the United States. Currently, 40 
percent of the corn grown in the United States 
is a genetically modified variety. This corn is 
approved by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) to be as safe for human con-
sumption as the corn grown using traditional 
farming methods. Because genetically modified 
corn is sometimes mixed with traditional corn 
during storage and transport, food products that 
have corn ingredients (like cornflakes) may or 
may not contain genetically modified corn. The 
only way to know for sure if cornflakes are 
made from genetically modified corn or not is 
if the manufacturers put this information on 
their product’s label. 
 
▪  Label information. There are 6 types of special 
labeling information concerning the possible 
presence or absence of genetically modified 
corn in the cereal. The information should be 
viewed as entirely truthful. This information 
will vary for products A and B, but choice C 
will always have no special label. “No special 
label” means that there is no indication as to 
whether or not the cornflakes contain geneti-
cally modified corn. Please note that the initials 
“USDA” used on some of the labels means the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
 
3 This may include such transfers as bacterium inserts into the plant or 
animal. 
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  A section of the choice modeling questionnaire 
provided instructions on choice selection. The 
instructions were as follows: “Carefully read and 
think about each question since you will be asked 
to select the box of cornflakes you most prefer 
out of three possible boxes of cornflakes. There 
are no right or wrong answers; we are interested 
only in your opinion.” The choice modeling 
questions were pre-tested at Rutgers with sugges-
tions to put “price” and “labeling statements” as 
row headings, and to put “survey instructions” at 
the top of the page. 
  The GM labeling statements used in this study 
were chosen based on extensive discussions and 
the GM labeling literature. The statements ranged 
from no information at all, to some information, 
to very detailed information about the label. The 
labeling information statements were framed in 
terms of label usefulness to the consumer deci-
sion making process (Caswell 2000). A fractional 
factorial experiment design was used to create a 
balanced and efficient design matrix for a number 
of choice sets. The product to be analyzed was 
characterized by two factors/attributes (i.e., label 
and price), each with six and five different levels, 
respectively (see Table 1 for details). The experi-
ment yielded 32 choice sets. After removal of the 
dominated choices, 28 choice sets remained. Two 
of the alternatives in each choice set were all 
variants of a labeling and price variation scheme. 
The status quo alternative (no special label) was 
constant and common to all choice sets. The 28 
choice sets were split (by blocking) into 4 sub-
sets, with each respondent randomly allocated 
one set of 7 questions to complete. 
  The actual choice questions were presented in 
the following manner: “Imagine you are at the 
grocery store and want to buy a box of corn-
flakes. You have to choose among three boxes of 
cornflakes: A, B, or C. Which will you choose? 
You’ll be asked to do this 7 times. While the 
combination of products may seem the same, they 
are all slightly different. Choose carefully and 
read all of the information given. By combining 
your choices with those of others, we will be able 
to better understand what is important to consum-
ers” (see Figure 2 for an example). The corn-
flakes contain the exact same ingredients except 
that some contain genetically modified corn and 
some do not. The cornflakes differ from each 
other on the basis of price, the presence of geneti-
cally modified corn, and special labeling infor-
mation about the product. “The boxes are all the 
same weight and the cornflakes all look and taste 
exactly the same.” 
 
Sample Socioeconomic Characteristics and 
Response Rates to the Choice Modeling 
Questions 
 
Table 2 shows that the composition of respon-
dents in the sub-sample closely mirrors the main 
sample (n  =  1,201) in terms of socioeconomic 
characteristics. Both samples show more female 
representation than male. Appropriate weighting 
was done as previously stated to ensure repre-
sentation of the sample. Respondents’ age ranged 
from 18 to 94, with those in the ages between 45 
and 54 being relatively overrepresented in the 
sub-sample. Most respondents (90 percent) had 
completed high school. High school was the 
highest level of formal education for more than a 
quarter of the sample (26 percent). About a quar-
ter (27 percent) had completed some college or an 
associate’s degree, while 24 percent of the sample 
had completed a four-year college degree and 13 
percent had earned a post-graduate degree. The 
remainder (8 percent) had not obtained a high 
school diploma. A little fewer than half (47 per-
cent) had household income less than $50,000, 
while the other half (45 percent) had household 
income greater than $50,000. 
  Table 3 shows the distribution of respondents’ 
answers to seven questions. The distribution of 
the choices shows substantial variation by block. 
For example, twice as many respondents in block 
1 chose option A (56 percent) as compared to 
respondents in block 4. An equal number of re-
spondents in each block chose option B. Respon-
dents in block 4, compared to the other blocks, 
chose relatively more of option C (33 percent). 
Across the blocks, about 3 percent of the respon-





Consumers’ choice of cornflakes under different 
labels is analyzed within the choice-modeling 
framework (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000). 
This is done within the random utility discrete 
choice model framework (McFadden 1978, 
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Table 1. Cornflakes—Attributes and Levels 
Attribute   Levels 
Price levels  Current price ($2.00) 
15% discount ($1.70) 
10% discount ($1.80) 
5% discount ($1.90) 
5% premium ($2.10) 
Labeling   No special label (Nospec.label) 
Contains no genetically modified corn (NOGMcorn) 
May contain genetically modified corn (MayGMcorn) 
Contains genetically modified corn (GMcorn) 
Corn genetically modified to reduce pesticide residues in your food (Reducepest) 





















Based on the following information, which would you choose—






Cornflakes B Cornflakes C
 




Revelt and Train 1998). Specifically, the study 
analyzes (i) how consumers value labeling infor-
mation in their food choices, and (ii) differential 
valuation of labeling information by content (i.e., 
from no information to detailed information). 
Since market data (revealed preferences in actual 
market situations) for GM food labels are not 
currently available, a survey instrument to elicit 
the consumers’ stated preferences is used. 
  In this framework, the consumer is assumed to 
have a well-behaved utility function (i.e., with 
preferences that are complete, reflexive, and tran-
sitive). The consumer, therefore, is able to com-
pare and rank alternative commodity bundles. In 
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Table 2. Socioeconomic Characteristics (%) 





Gender    
 male    37.9 36.4 
 female    62.1 63.6 
Age    
  18 to 24  11.0  8.5 
  25 to 34  15.3  13.8 
  35 to 44  20.6  20.4 
  45 to 54  21.4  24.5 
  55 to 64  14.0  14.9 
  65 or older  17.7  17.9 
Education    
  less than high school   8.4 6.9 
 high  school    26.9 26.2 
 some  college    27.6 31.5 
 four-year  college  23.9 22.4 
 post  graduate    13.2 13.0 
Household Income    
 under  $25,000  16.7  17.9 
  $25,000 to $34,999  13.5  13.8 
  $35,000 to $49,999  14.4  15.2 
  $50,000 to $74,999  19.2  22.3 
  $75,000 to $99,999  10.2  14.0 
  $100,000 to $124,999  5.9  5.2 
  $125,000 or more  6.7 6.1 
aThe choice modeling sub-sample. 
 
 
relation to particular choice sets, the various op-
tions available are contained in a universal choice 
set S. A consumer may consider all or only a sub-
set of these options or choose none of them. The 
Lancaster (1966a, 1966b) model provides the 
framework to analyze the consumer preferences. 
In this model, consumer i derives a total utility 
(Uij) for choosing option j, from a finite set S. The 






( )  Nospec.label
                      NOGMcorn MayGMcorn
                      GMcorn Reducepest
                      USDA Price .






=+ ε = β
+β + β
+β + β
+β + β +
 
 
  The explanatory variables are the attributes 
(label statements and price; see Table 1) where Vij 
is the deterministic part, which is a function of a 
vector, Xij, consisting of choice-specific attributes 
as well as individual specific characteristics (e.g., 
age, sex, etc.), and a random part εij, which is un-
observable. In the estimation process, we did not 
use any of the demographic variables.
4 The ran-
dom component is assumed to be independent of 
Xij and follows some predetermined distribution. 
The consumer’s decision process involves defin-
ing the choice problem, generating the alterna-
tives, evaluating the attributes of the alternative, 
making a choice, and implementing (action), i.e., 
choosing alternative j if 
 
(2)  () () ; ij ij ij in in in VX VX j nS +ε> + ε ∀≠∈ . 
 
The probability that the consumer chooses the op-
tion j is given by 
 
(3)   .  Prob prob{ ; , } ij ij ij in in VV j n n =+ ε ≥ + ε ∀ ≠ ∀ ∈ S
 
  The model is implemented by making assump-
tions about the distribution εj. Assuming that εj 
are iid with type-I extreme value (Gumbel) distri-
bution, the probability that the consumer i chooses 



















(McFadden 1973), where β is a vector of pa-
rameters to be estimated and µ is a scale parame-
ter that is usually assumed to equal 1 so that the 
β’s can be identified. The vector β also includes a 
series of alternative specific constants (ASC) that 
capture the effects in utility from any attributes 
not included in Xij (equation 1), which leads to the 
standard conditional logit model. However, the 
above model suffers from the restrictive inde-
pendence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) prop-
erty, and therefore is unable to incorporate pref-
erence heterogeneity across consumers. To ad-
dress this problem, we model consumer prefer-
ence using the random parameter logit model 
(Brownstone and Train 1999, Louviere, Hensher, 
and Swait 2000, Bonnet and Simioni 2001). The 
random parameter logit model allows all choice- 
specific parameters to vary randomly across indi-
                                                                                    
4 Taste heterogeneity in our model is attributable more to product 
attributes than to socioeconomic variables. Without loss of generality, 
their exclusion does not adversely affect our results. 
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Table 3. Percent Response to the Seven Questions by Block 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7  TOTAL 
Block 1          
Option  A  0.19 0.61 0.26 0.60 0.26 0.81 0.51 0.46 
Option  B  0.69 0.22 0.55 0.13 0.31 0.06 0.43 0.34 
Option  C  0.09 0.13 0.15 0.27 0.43 0.12 0.07 0.18 
No  response 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 
TOTAL  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1 
          
Block 2           
Option  A  0.88 0.04 0.65 0.38 0.46 0.91 0.60 0.56 
Option  B  0.04 0.64 0.06 0.48 0.50 0.05 0.36 0.31 
Option  C  0.06 0.29 0.27 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.12 
No  response 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
TOTAL  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1 
          
Block 3          
Option  A  0.35 0.58 0.28 0.53 0.25 0.42 0.52 0.42 
Option  B  0.52 0.30 0.46 0.06 0.12 0.39 0.41 0.32 
Option  C  0.10 0.08 0.25 0.39 0.61 0.18 0.06 0.24 
No  response 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
TOTAL  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1 
          
Block 4          
Option  A  0.05 0.53 0.35 0.02 0.52 0.02 0.22 0.25 
Option  B  0.89 0.19 0.34 0.54 0.39 0.19 0.21 0.39 
Option  C  0.06 0.25 0.27 0.41 0.06 0.75 0.53 0.33 
No  response 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
TOTAL  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1 
Note: Options A, B, and C are cornflakes choice options. 
 
 
viduals. That is, the β in equation (4) becomes βi. 
It is further assumed that βi is drawn from a joint 
density function, the parameters of which (the 
mean and standard deviation) are recovered by 
simulation. 
  The random parameter logit model assumes 
that consumers’ choices are conditional on the 
specification of the distribution of the coeffi-
cients. Letting θ denote the distribution of pa-
rameter of coefficient β, the probability of indi-
vidual i choosing alternative j is given by 
(5)  (|) ij ij PP f d =β θ ∫ β , 
where Pij is as in equation (4) and f(β|θ) is the 
probability density function for coefficient β de-
fined over a vector of parameter θ. The log likeli-
hood function is given by 
 











where Dij is an indicator, which equals one if in-
dividual  i chooses alternative j and zero other-
wise. The integration expression in equation (5) 
cannot be efficiently estimated with maximum 
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likelihood estimation. However, the probability Pij 
can be simulated according to the density f(β|θ). 
The parameters of the model in equation (1) are 
estimated using the Maximum Simulated Likeli-
hood Estimator (MSLE) (Brownstone and Train 





The random parameter logit model results are 
presented in Table 4 and Figure 3. The estimated 
mean for price as well as the estimated means and 
associated standard deviations of the random at-
tributes are reported. Also presented is the will-
ingness to pay for the labeling statements, along 
with the corresponding 95 percent confidence 
intervals (i.e., the lower and upper bounds). The 
model was estimated with simulated maximum 
likelihood using the Halton draws with 250 repli-
cations, a simulation technique that uses non-ran-
dom draws from the distributions to be integrated 
over, rather than random draws. By drawing from 
a sequence designed to give a fairly even cover-
age over the mixing distribution, fewer draws are 
needed to reduce simulation variance to an ac-
ceptable level. The overall model performance is 
given by the chi-squared test, which is significant 
at the 5 percent level. 
  The presence of the standard deviations of the 
mean values accommodates the presence of het-
erogeneity assumed in the random parameter logit 
model specification. The results show that the 
standard deviations of all the random attributes 
are highly significant with the exception of the 
labeling statement “may contain genetically 
modified corn,” implying heterogeneity in prefer-
ences across the respondents. It can be observed 
that all the t-ratios for the standard deviations 
associated with the attributes are significant and 
show large differences. Of the significant stan-
dard deviations, the labeling statement “corn ge-
netically modified to reduce pesticides” shows the 
largest variation, while the labeling statement 
“contains no GM corn” shows the least variation. 
  As discussed above, 559 respondents agreed to 
participate in the mail survey. Of these, 363 com-
pleted the survey; 7 surveys were incomplete. In 
this analysis, we used the 356 completed surveys. 
Although these surveys yielded 7,476 (356 × 7 × 
3) choice sets, after removal of lexicographic 
responses,
5 7,182 choice sets were actually ana-
lyzed (96 percent of clean choice sets). About 4 
percent of the respondents were lexicographic—
i.e., those respondents who would choose neither 
A nor B regardless of the attributes. Therefore, 
inclusion of lexicographic respondents will not be 
amenable to choice modeling since explaining 
their choices on the basis of attribute levels (the 
basic premise of choice modeling) would produce 
biased estimates. 
  The results show both negative and positive 
labeling valuations on the choice of cornflakes. 
The negative valuation for a label statement im-
plies that moving from the conventional label (the 
current position, i.e., no label) reduces consumer 
utility. Conversely, those labeling statements that 
were positively valued imply increasing con-
sumer utility, consequently improving consumer 
utility in making a decision related to the corn-
flakes. In such a situation, consumers are willing 
to move from their current positions towards po-
sitions providing more information on the foods 
they choose to buy or consume. 
  The (WTP) values were estimated by evaluat-
ing the ratio of the labeling statement coefficient 
to the coefficient of price.
6 For example, the dis-
tribution of the labeling statement “contains no 
genetically modified corn” has an estimated mean 
coefficient of 2.3246 and an estimated standard 
deviation of 2.6977. Given the estimated price 
coefficient of –.1146, the model implies a mean 
of 20 cents or $0.20 willingness to pay for such 
information with a standard deviation of 24 cents 
($0.24). Given the assumption of normal distri-
bution for the labeling statements, about 18 per-
cent of the consumers placed a negative valuation 
on the labeling statements “contains no geneti-
cally modified corn.” 
  Positive mean willingness to pay was associ-
ated with the following labeling statements: 
“contains no genetically modified corn,” “USDA-
 
5 The removal of the lexicographic preferences also accounts for those 
respondents who opted for C in all of their repeated choices, on 
account of the fact that they were uncertain about the product. In our 
analysis we have excluded such responses. As a result, our definition 
and analysis are based on those responses making use of the variation 
in attributes (i.e., the content of the labeling information in making 
their choices on the product).  
6 Given the indirect utility function (equation 1) v = β’x = Σβixi, the 
WTP is given by (dv/dxi)/(dv/dxj), where the numerator is the attribute 
and the denominator is the price, thus the WTP equals –(βi/βj)/100 
converted to dollars. 
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Table 4. Parameter Estimates: The Random Parameter Logit Model (normally distributed 
random parameters) 
Variable   Coefficient  t-ratio  p-value 
Price   -0.1146  -3.89  0.00 
Contains no genetically modified corn  mean coefficient  2.3246  9.94  0.00 
  standard deviation of the coefficient  2.6977  10.43  0.00 
May contain genetically modified corn mean  coefficient  -0.2293  -1.12  0.26 
  standard deviation of the coefficient  2.4128  10.50  0.00 
Contains genetically modified corn mean  coefficient  -1.5020  -5.16  0.00 
  standard deviation of the coefficient  3.2473  9.66  0.00 
Corn genetically modified to reduce 
pesticide residues in your food 
mean coefficient 







USDA-approved genetically modified 
corn 
mean coefficient 








      
Log likelihood  -963.21       
Restricted log likelihood  -1386.29       
Chi square  846.17       
DF 39       
Mean Willingness to Pay  Mean  Std Dev.  Lower Bound  Upper Bound
Contains no genetically modified corn  20.29  23.54  -26.79  67.38 
May contain genetically modified  corn  -2.00  21.06 -49.08 40.11 
Contains genetically modified  corn  -13.11  28.34 -60.19 43.57 
Corn genetically modified to reduce 
pesticide residues in your food 
7.32 46.48  -39.76  100.27 
USDA-approved genetically modified 
corn 




approved genetically modified corn,” and “corn 
genetically modified to reduce pesticide residues 
in food.” Consumers’ willingness to pay for the 
labeling statements may also suggest public trust 
and confidence in government regulatory agen-
cies. In this respect, the USDA-approved label 
statement may be seen as conveying product 
safety and may therefore enhance public accep-
tance of the GM food. 
  On the other hand, the labeling statement “may 
contain GM corn,” although insignificant, may be 
seen as not providing any meaningful information 
to the consumer. Therefore, it is not a good signal 
to aid decision making. The results show that 
consumers were willing to pay for more informa-
tion on the label; i.e., they were willing to pay 20 
cents more for the cornflakes with a label clearly 
stating that the product contains no GM modified 
corn, almost 10 cents more for a cereal that has 
been approved by the USDA, and 7 cents more 
for cornflakes bearing a label stating that the ge-
netically modified product reduces pesticides in 
the food. The results also show how much it will 
take consumers to accept certain labeling state-
ments. Consumers will require a discount of 1 
percent for the statement “may contain GM corn” 
and a discount of 6.5 percent for the statement 





This paper examines consumer attitudes towards 
GM foods and the trade-offs made between la-
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Figure 3. Labeling Statements—Mean Willingness to Pay 
 
 
beling statements for GM foods. The results of 
this study show that the choice modeling experi-
ments provide a way of valuing labeling state-
ments by facilitating consumer choice, thus giv-
ing some direction as to what consumer prefer-
ences will be if GM products are labeled in a par-
ticular manner. Consumer preference for labeled 
GM cornflakes is influenced by the nature of in-
formation conveyed by the different labeling 
statements. Results generally suggest that state-
ments that inform the consumer about product 
certification and benefits are valued positively. 
On the other hand, statements that indicate only 
the possible presence of GM are valued nega-
tively. Consumer’ willingness to pay a premium 
for certain label statements such as “contains no 
GM corn,” “USDA-approved GM corn,” and 
“corn genetically modified to reduce pesticide 
residues in your food” shows that there is a po-
tential market for labeled GM foods. The differ-
ences in the valuation of the statements also im-
ply that some statements are preferred to others. 
  The information generated by this study can be 
used as a guide for the food industry and gov-
ernment in the design of possible labeling 
schemes that can add value to consumer choice of 
GM foods. Future studies, however, should repli-
cate the present study to assess the robustness of 
these findings. The studies should consider other 
labeling statements not included in this study. 
Additionally, it may be worthwhile to carry out a 
cost-benefit analysis on voluntary and mandatory 
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